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Abstract
This paper analyzes if men and women are expected to behave dif-
ferently regarding altruism. Since the dictator game provides the most
suitable design for studying altruism and generosity in the lab setting,
we use a modied version to study the beliefs involved in the game. Our
results are substantial: men and women are expected to behave di¤er-
ently. Moreover, while women believe that women are more generous,
men consider women as generous as men.
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1 Introduction
A vast amount of the literature in Social Sciences analyzes di¤erences in behavior
between men and women. This includes relevant topics of economic inquiry such
as labor segregation, gender pay gap and patterns of tacit discrimination. In the
last two decades, experimentalists have contributed to this research by providing
explanations based on the di¤erences in preferences between men and women
(see Croson and Gneezy, 2006).1
We thank Tim Cason and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and sug-
gestions. Also, Martha revised the English language of this version. Financial support is
gratefully acknowledge by Spanish Ministry SEJ2007-62081/ECON, Junta de Andalucia P07-
02547 and CEA (SOCH2.05/43).
1Experimental economists have just continued a fruitful line of research developed by ex-
perimental and social psychologists. For a review of the psychological evidence, see Eagly
(1995).
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Experimental economics have focused mainly in three di¤erent domains
where gender bias is present. First, several experimental and eld investiga-
tions have shown that women are more risk averse than men (Eckel and Gross-
man forthcoming). Second, men react very di¤erently than women when facing
highly competitive environments (Gneezy et al. 2003; Gneezy and Rusticini
2004; Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). Note that these two ndings are also
quite consistent with an evolutionary account of sex di¤erences in preferences
(Croson and Gneezy 2006).
The third domain where gender di¤erences have been found is social pref-
erences. However, as Cox and Deck (2006) analysis shows, the magnitude and
direction of these di¤erences are far from being known and explained. One po-
tential reason for the latter is the fact that experimental economics research on
gender and social preferences have mainly explored behavioral disparities (i.e.,
di¤erences in revealed preferences). This paper contributes to this debate by
exploring di¤erences in beliefs between men and women, i.e., not gender di¤er-
ences per se but how subjects perceive behavioral di¤erences between men and
women.2
As a rst attempt to address perceived gender di¤erences in social pref-
erences, in this paper, we examine a clear and straightforward question: Do
subjects hold special beliefs for females regarding generosity? This rst approx-
imation is related only to individualsperceived generosity.3 To achieve this end,
we performed a highly intuitive design. Subjects (recipients) received detailed
instructions explaining the dictator game and were then shown two boxes. The
box on the left contained 20 dictatorial allocations made by 20 females, while
the box on the right contained another 20 divisions made by 20 males. The
experimental subjects were told that they would receive the amount of money
written on one, just one, of the slips of paper drawn randomly (with replace-
ment) from one of the two boxes. The subjectstask involved choosing one of
the two boxes.4 They were also asked to ll out a questionnaire.
The results are substantial: i) only one-third of the subjects chose the men
box; ii) almost 80% of women chose the female box; iii) only 52% of males prefer
the male box.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: design is described in Section
2, results are shown in Section 3 followed by a discussion of our main result in
Section 4.
2Although the question about beliefs of others generosity has not adequately being ad-
dressed by experimental economists, many papers elicit and report the beliefs of the partic-
ipants in situations that trigger social preferences. Specically, there are some evidence on
the role played by gender beliefs on social preferences. See, for instance, Eckel and Grossman
(2002) on risk-taking and stereotyping , or Buchan et al. (forthcoming) on trust.
3The Slovin and Gabardino (forthcoming) study has some similarities to ours, but they
analyzed the frequency women and men choose a partner for both a Trust and a Dictator
Game. Our design mainly di¤ers from that of Slovin and Gabardino in the fact that subjects
play both the role of dictator and recipient in their experiment while in ours, subjects play
only as recipients.
4Recall that, whereas papers like Eckel and Grosman (1998) examine if women are more
generous than men in DG, we explore if they are expected to be di¤erent.
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2 Experimental design and procedures
Two di¤erent sessions were conducted at the University of Granada (Spain) with
40 and 28 participants, respectively. Subjects were recruited via posters placed
throughout the University announcing the experiment. Individuals conrmed
their attendance via E-mail.5 The two experimental sessions were conducted
consecutively. Both experimental sessions were controlled in such a way as to
prevent participants from communicating with one another.6 On average, each
subject earned 8 euros (including a 2.5 euro show-up fee) for a one-hour session.
Subjects were given written instructions (see the attached le) which were
also read aloud by the experimenter to ensure that all participants received the
same information. Communication between subjects was not allowed.
The experiment was conducted in two di¤erent phases. In the rst phase
subjects were required to make four sequential decisions.7 Subjects were then
asked to answer a short questionnaire asking them to justify their decisions
during the experiment.
In the following, we focus on the basic task subjects faced. Two di¤erent
boxes labeled womenand menwere placed at the front part of a room. Each
box contained 20 slips of paper. Each slip was printed with the donation made
by each of 40 dictators (20 women + 20 men) which were randomly selected
-using a list of random numbers generated by computer- from an entire subject
pool that had participated in previous sessions of a standard dictator game.8
The only decision participants had to make was to select the box they pre-
ferred (either the womenor the menbox). First, they have to write down
their decision on a piece of paper (which had a code on the top right corner).
After collecting the decision sheets of all participants, each subject was called
with her code to extract one slip of paper from the box she had already cho-
sen. The number printed on the slip of paper determined the money she would
earn. After writing down the corresponding number of coins each participant
had won, her slip of paper was put again in the specic box. Therefore, all
participants faced the same sample of allocations.
The initial intuition underlying this design is based on the assumption that
subjects want to maximize their expected payo¤s and therefore participants
tend to choose the box in which they expect to obtain a higher average payo¤.
5Among the participants, 25 studied Economics, 27 Business, 6 Engineering, and 10 Hu-
manities and Social Sciences.
6There are no statistical di¤erences between participantsbehavior in the sessions regarding
the main task of the experiment (Mann-Whitney Z =  0:149; p = 0:881).
7The rst part of the experiment involved four steps: choosing a box, drawing a payment
card and making two guesses regarding the money they expected to earn. However, only the
rst step is analyzed in this paper.
8This previous dictator game experiment was conducted at the University of Granada in
January 2006. In that experiment every participant received ten 50-cent coins and was asked
to divide this amount of money between herself and another unknown person. The minimum
allocation was 0 and the maximum allocation was 5 (only one female allocation was above this
range, giving 6 to the recipient). The mean of the 20 randomly selected female allocations
was 3.2 and the standard deviation 1.73, whereas the mean male allocation was 2.45 and the
standard deviation 1.96. For more details see Brañas-Garza (2007).
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Thus, subjectschoices will reveal their beliefs about which sex is more generous
in the dictator game.
After completing all the tasks and answering the questionnaire, payo¤s were
calculated and subjects were paid in cash privately.
3 Results
We will now explore decisions of the participants. The results are summarized
in Table 1 which shows the number of males choosing males and females and the
number of females choosing females and males. Table 1 contains the 68 subjects
who took the decision.
As reported in Table 1, the womenbox was chosen in 63:2% of the cases.
This e¤ect is even more evident when di¤erentiating by gender (of subjects
choosing the box). We observe that 78:7% of the females chose the women
box. In contrast, only 48:6% of the males chose the women box. The 2-
Pearson test supports the hypothesis that the decision-makerssex does a¤ect
the choice of box (2 = 6:67; p = 0:01).
Table 1: Subjects decisions
females males total
Gender Chosen women 26(78:7%) 17 43(63:2%)
men 7 18(51:4%) 25
total 33 35 68
Result 1: Women do consider that they are more generous but males do not
report any gender bias.
4 Conclusion
This paper explores a very interesting issue in experimental economics: which
sex is expected to be more generous? With this aim we design a very simple
mechanism. Subjects have to choose between two di¤erent boxes labelled men
and womenplaced in a room. The boxes contain slips of paper printed with
the decisions made by players in a previous dictator game. Subjectspayo¤s
depend on the number printed on the slip of paper. Subjects only have to
choose which box (men or women) they want their slip of paper to be randomly
drawn from.
Our results are quite interesting: i) the majority of the population (63%)
chose the box of womens donations and, ii) this percentage is even stronger for
women, if we make the analysis discriminating by gender (79% of women chose
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the female box). In fact, women were more generous than men in the previous
experiment (3.2 vs 2.45, on average).9
The fact that people entertain di¤erent beliefs, and thus di¤erent expec-
tations, about the actions of men and women could inuence labor market
behavior in at least two di¤erent ways. First, if women are expected to be less
competitive, this may turn into less job vacancies for women in highly compet-
itive environments (usually the best paid). Second, if women are perceived to
be more generous, this may turn into labor segregation (women being o¤ered
predominantly care jobs) and higher number of parental leaves taken by women.
As Grimshaw and Rubery (2001) put it:
Moreover, if as a result of accepted patterns of gender behavior
and socialization, women are less comfortable in a competitive en-
vironment, then this new focus on employability and boundaryless
careers may favor men over women.
References
[1] N. Buchan, R. A. Croson and S. Solnick. Forthcoming. Trust and Gender:
An Examination of Behavior, Biases, and Beliefs in the Investment Game,
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
[2] P. Brañas-Garza. 2007. Promoting helping behavior with framing in dic-
tator games, Journal of Economic Psychology 28(4): 477-486.
[3] D.J. Cooper, J.H. Kagel, W. Lo, Q.L. Gu. 1999. Gamint against man-
agers in incentive systems: experimental results with Chinese students and
Chinese managers. American Economic Review 89, 781804.
[4] J. Cox and C. Deck. 2006. When Are Women More Generous than Men?,
Economic Inquiry 44(6): 587-598.
[5] R. Croson and U. Gneezy. 2006. Gender Di¤erences in Preferences, The
Wharton School mimeo.
[6] A. H. Eagly. 1995. The science and politics of comparing women and men,
American Psychologist 50, 145-158.
[7] C. Eckel and P. J. Grossman. 1998. Are Women Less Selsh than Men?:
Evidence from Dictator Experiments, The Economic Journal 108:726-
735.
9The reader must keep in mind that our subject pool was composed by university students.
The main objection made to this kind of population is the subject pool bias. However,
experimental literature has shown that although there are some quantitative subject pool
e¤ects, the qualitative patterns of behavior are rather similar across di¤erent pools (see Falk
and Fehr 2003, Cooper et al. 1999 or Fehr and List 2003), so we could considered obtained
results as a rst approximation of the populations beliefs.
5
[8] C. Eckel and P. Grossman. 2002. Sex Di¤erences and Statistical Stereotyp-
ing in Attitudes Toward Financial Risk.Evolution and Human Behavior
23(4): 281-295.
[9] C. Eckel and P. J. Grossman. Forthcoming. Men, women and risk aversion:
experimental evidence, Handbook of Experimental Economic Results.
[10] A. Falk and E. Fehr. 2003. Why labour market experiments?, Labour
Economics 10: 399406.
[11] E. Fehr, and J. List. 2003. The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives-
Trust and Trustworthiness among CEOs. WP 134. Institute for Empirical
Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Zurich.
[12] U. Gneezy, M. Niederle and A. Rustichini. 2003. Performance in Com-
petitive environments: Gender di¤erencesThe Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 118(3): 1050-1074.
[13] U. Gneezy and A. Rustichini. 2004. Gender and Competition at a young
ageAmerican Economic Review 94(2): 377-381.
[14] D. Grimshaw and J. Rubery. 2001. The gender pay gap: a research
review, Research Discussion Series, Equal Opportunities Commission,
Manchester.
[15] M. Niederle and L. Vesterlund. 2007. Do women shy away from competi-
tion? Do men compete too much?, The Quarterly Journal of Economics
122(3): 1067-1101.
[16] R. Slonim and E. Garbarino. Forthcoming. "Increases in trust and altruism
from partner selection: Experimental evidence, Experimental Economics.
6
